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ABSTRACT 
Traditionally, knowledge is classified as “Justified True Belief” but for the problem of infinite regress, 
Descartes came up with an indubitable foundation upon which he believes secured knowledge could 
be established. There were several incursions of epistemological problems associated with the justifi-
cation of foundationalism and many versions ranging from the classical to coherentism and foundher-
entism eventually emerged, but, none was without its embedded problems. Chisholm however came 
up with a version of foundationalism, a development over Cartesian foundationalism, based on the 
principles of self-presenting to solve the problem of infallibility and indubitability. The “self-presenting” 
is an improved version of the Cartessian basic beliefs. Therefore, this paper attempts a comparative 
analysis of the Cartesian basic beliefs and Chisholm’s “self-presenting” thesis using the philosophical 
analytical and conceptual methods to determine how successful Chisholm has been in his exploit.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Rene Descartes is considered the father of 
modern philosophy because he brought 
philosophy out of the medieval period to a 
new era of scientific revolution of Coperni-
cus, Kepler, Galileo and later on, Newton. 
Even though he did not actually break up 
with scholasticism, he did not accept the 
philosophical foundation laid by them. He 
went in search of a new foundation envi-
sioned for science and philosophy. He dis-
covered the cogito (I am thinking, therefore I 
exist) which became the awareness of basic, 
self-evident and necessary truth upon which 
the foundation of knowledge and philoso-
phical theory can be built. The cogito was the 
result of the Cartesian methodic doubt; it 
serves as the basis of epistemological foun-
dationalism stated in terms of clarity, dis-
tinctness and certainty that are self-evidently 
true (Descartes, 1931: 92-94). The traditional 
account of knowledge or “theory of justifica-
tion” concerning a proposition states that S 
knows that p iff (i) p is true: truth condition 
(ii) S believes that p: belief condition and (iii) 
S is justified in believing that p: evidence 
condition (Dancy, 1985: 23). This definition 
with Plato in perspective held sway in the 
philosophers’ analysis of knowledge until the 
Gettier problem. In two counter-examples, 
Gettier argues that the tripartite conditions 
of the traditional account of knowledge even 
though may be necessary cannot be suffi-
cient for knowledge because it is possible for 
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acterized by the thesis that there exists some 
class of beliefs which have some degree of 
justification that are not derived from rela-
tion to other beliefs. These beliefs, according 
to these theories, provide us with genuine 
and secured foundation for knowledge.  The 
classical foundationalists divide our beliefs 
into two groups: those that need support 
from others and those that can support oth-
ers but need no support for themselves. The 
latter constitutes our epistemological founda-
tion while the former are the superstructure 
built on these foundations. The Cartesian 
argues that basic beliefs expressed in basic 
propositions are necessarily true because 
they are immediately derived from our psy-
chological states. They are non-inferentially 
justified and spontaneously derived from 
intuition. Basic beliefs are so direct and im-
mediate that the Cartesians believe that it will 
be difficult for them to be fallible. According 
to Descartes, they are characterized by 
“clearness, distinctness and cer-
tainty” (Descartes, 1931:94). 
 
Descartes argues that the cogito, basic belief, 
is what we know by intuition. Beliefs derived 
as such, according to him, are distinct, clear, 
indubitable and credible with no fear of error 
(Sosa, 1980:4). These beliefs are devoid of 
error and infallibility because they are imme-
diate experience of our sensory states. The 
infallible status of basic beliefs gives them 
the power to justify other beliefs about ex-
ternal world, about science, about our past 
and future, about other minds and so on. 
Kai H Kwok (1998:2) argues that beliefs ca-
pable of holding such a high degree of stan-
dard of basic beliefs are “beliefs about 
mathematics and beliefs about sensations”. 
 
Basic beliefs are essentially characterized by 
three features which include (i) they are non-
inferentially justified (ii) they are self justified 
a person to be justified in believing a false 
proposition (Gettier, 1963: 121). 
 
The focus of the theory of justification 
is directed towards the evidence condition 
which requires that our beliefs need be jus-
tified before they can pass the test of 
knowledge (Armstrong, 1974: 137). But, 
how can our beliefs be justified without re-
sulting into an infinite regress? The tradi-
tional account of knowledge projects that 
“knowledge is justified true belief”. And for 
beliefs to be justified without resulting into 
an infinite regress, it requires that some of 
our beliefs are non-inferentially justified 
while others are inferentially justified. 
Hence, our beliefs relation stops at the non-
inferentially justified beliefs else we run into 
an infinite regress problem. The terminal 
point of all beliefs, the non-inferentially jus-
tified beliefs, is the Cartesian foundation 
upon which the edifice of knowledge rests 
and that which stops the epistemic regress 
problem. Basic beliefs or basic propositions 
stopped the vicious infinite regress that may 
arise in the account of the justification of 
empirical beliefs (Bonjour, 1985: 54). 
 
Chisholm’s foundationalism is a develop-
ment over the Cartesian foundationalism. It 
is an attempt to resolve some of the crisis 
generated by Cartesian foundationalism. He 
thus proposed “self-presenting” as a re-
placement for basic beliefs with improved 
characteristics. This paper attempts a com-
parative analysis of the Cartesian basic be-
liefs and Chisholm’s “self-presenting” to 
determine how successful Chisholm’s ver-
sion has been able to resolve the epistemic 
regress in foundationalism. 
 
Basic Beliefs 
Foundation theories, such as classical foun-
dationalism and foundaherentism are char-
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is self-presenting, then, for 
every X, if (i) X has the prop-
erty of being F, and if (ii) X 
considers his being F, then it 
is certain that X has the 
property of being F 
(Chisholm in Dancy, 
1985 :543) 
 
Therefore, if being sad is a self-presenting 
property, then if you are sad and if you con-
sider whether you are sad, it will be certain 
for you that you are sad. And if considering 
this is also self-presenting, and if you con-
sider whether you are sad, then it will be evi-
dent to you that you are considering whether 
you are sad. Hence, we could deduce from 
p1 that; 
For every X, if (i) X has the 
property of being sad and if 
(ii) X considers his being sad, 
then it is certain for X that he 
then has the property of be-
ing sad (544) 
 
We could affirm from the above argument 
that for every X, if it is certain for X that he 
has the property of being F, then the propo-
sition that something is F is one that is epis-
temically certain for X. 
 
The Notion of Basic Beliefs and “Self-
presenting” 
Basic propositions are what the classical 
foundationalist considers as basic beliefs. 
They are the product of our immediate ex-
perience derived from our sensory states. 
They are self-justified and provide secured 
foundation upon which the justifications of 
other propositions are built. Basic proposi-
tions are considered infallible by the Carte-
sian foundationalists because of its nature in 
perception; they are the product of our sen-
sory states and so are perceived directly. The 
and (iii) their justifications are non-doxastic, 
that is, they must be justified on the basis of 
something which is not a belief (perception, 
memory or introspection). They are pro-
posed to solve the epistemic regress prob-
lem: the problem of how to avoid an infi-
nite and presumably vicious regress of justi-
fication in one’s account of the justification 
of empirical beliefs. 
 
Chisholm’s “Self-presenting” Thesis 
Chisholm believes that some properties are 
self-evident, clear and distinct to the per-
ceiver just as the Cartesian position. The 
self-presenting is like the Descartes’ cogito 
ergo sum. He gave the example of “someone 
feeling sad”; “thinking about the moun-
tain”; “believing oneself to be wise”; 
“appeared redly to”, etc. He argues that 
such locutions are self-presenting because 
they are necessarily true in that if a person 
has them and he considers having them or 
not, he will ipso facto directly attribute them 
to himself. He claims that they are proper-
ties we cannot contradict. If we have them 
and consider whether we have them or not, 
we cannot deny having them (for example, 
if I am sad). Self-presenting also can be in 
the form of “being appeared to”. If some-
thing appears to you redly and you have a 
direct attribution of it to yourself, then it 
becomes self-presenting. For Chisholm, the 
direct attribution of a property to oneself is 
objectively certain if it is beyond reasonable 
doubt for that person to accept it. If cer-
tainty constitutes the highest degree of epis-
temic justification, then it is not out of place 
to claim that anything that has a self-
presenting property is an object of certainty 
for that person.  He affirms a “material 
epistemic principle” which shows a relation 
to certainty. 
 
P1 if the property of being F 
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tesian foundationalism, it is argued that basic 
propositions are the product of our psycho-
logical disposition; hence, they cannot be 
divorced from the fact that we do give 
“consideration” or better still, do consider 
our basic beliefs. 
 
Chisholm claims that if a property is “self-
presenting” then the following obtains: 
i. it is necessarily such that if a per-       
      son has it and if he considers     
       having it or not, then he ipso   
       facto directly attributes the prop- 
       erty to himself; 
 
ii. that the property remains what it   
      is even when we consider having                 
      it. 
 
In other words, “self-presenting” becomes 
an unconscious phenomenon if the subject 
does not give consideration to it by the time 
he is having it. For example, feeling sad is 
necessarily such that if you do feel sad and if 
you consider the question whether you are 
feeling sad or not, then you will believe your-
self as feeling sad. This, on a similar note 
applies to all other intentional attitudes. To 
have “self-presenting” is as good as consid-
ering having it else it becomes irrelevant to 
epistemic foundation. What makes it relevant 
to knowledge is the ability to consider having 
it. Chisholm further argues that “self-
presenting” property constitutes the highest 
degree of epistemic justification for it is an 
object of certainty for the subject. So, if be-
ing sad is a self-presenting property, then, if 
you are sad and you consider being sad, it 
becomes self-evident to you that you are sad. 
 
Just as Descartes proposed the concepts, 
“distinct and clear” as the pillar upon which 
the edifice of knowledge rest or the criteria 
for determining all truths, Chisholm also 
equivalence of basic propositions is “self-
presenting” in Chisholm’s version of foun-
dationalism. It has the closest property to 
what the Cartesian described as basic belief. 
The “self-presenting” properties present 
themselves to the subject intuitively and 
they are the product of psychological states 
as well. According to Chisholm, the “self-
presenting” constitutes its own justification 
and it is self-evident as basic beliefs are self-
evident and are self-justified for the Carte-
sian foundationalism. 
 
The “self-presenting” properties are not 
infallible: they are merely described in terms 
of properties. The Mooreans are also of a 
similar notion about the status of basic be-
liefs. For them, basic beliefs are not infalli-
ble but incorrigible just because it is the last 
of human beliefs that are logically impossi-
ble to correct: they are human final court of 
appeal (Kekes, 1977: 90). What divides the 
Mooreans from the Cartesians here is that 
while the Cartesian claims that basic propo-
sitions report private psychological states, 
the Mooreans hold that basic propositions 
are readily observable public facts. The Car-
tesian foundationalist argues that basic be-
liefs are the terminal point of justification 
and that no new issue of justification is 
raised beyond them. The concept of “self-
presenting” is close to self-justifier yet it 
gives room for other evidential presupposi-
tions which can still support it to building 
an edifice of knowledge: it is fallible but in-
corrigible. Chisholm says that the fact that 
someone has a “self-presenting” property 
does not mean that it is self-evident to him. 
He emphasizes the importance of consider-
ing having the property. It is only when one 
considers having the property that it be-
comes evidential to him that he has it. 
Then, “self-presenting” is necessarily tied to 
consciousness. Also, on the side of the Car-
   E. O. AKINTONA                   
91 J. Hum. Soc. Sci. Crtv. Arts 2013, 8: 88-97 
possibility of making mistakes in interpreting 
his perceptual experience. And if this be the 
case, we cannot have infallible beliefs. In hu-
man everyday perception, the senses mediate 
between the perceiver and the world and 
since the senses can mislead and the infor-
mation obtained through them can be misin-
terpreted, error can occur. Actually, in the 
absence of interpretation in observation, it is 
possible to have an infallible belief but there 
is no perception devoid of the mediation of 
the senses; hence, no direct knowledge. We 
do perceive and respond to the world within 
the limits set by our senses, physiology and 
motor capacity (Sosa, 1980: 6), but these do 
not guarantee that the facts are as they seem 
to us to be. At least, we must interpret the 
facts through our psychological and cogni-
tive equipment, and this interpretation may 
be faulty. Based on these considerations, 
Chisholm proposed a fallible foundation 
(self-presenting) which is capable of justify-
ing a system of knowledge. This foundation, 
even though, may fall short of certainty, yet, 
it goes beyond uncertainty (6). 
 
Appraising Chisholm’ foundationalism  
Foundationalism is a fundamental theory 
that is very important to philosophy as an 
enterprise. It is very basic and it is that which 
has been and is still keeping philosophy go-
ing. All our attempts in epistemology vis-à-
vis philosophy are to ascertain whether the 
knowledge we claim to have is true. Thus, 
most of the basic theories in epistemology 
have just one major objective, and that is, to 
establish a solid foundation upon which the 
whole super-structure of our knowledge 
could be built. 
 
The continental rationalists of whom Des-
cartes is a classical example are all founda-
tionalists and all their efforts were geared 
towards providing a clear ground for indubi-
proposed an epistemic concept, 
“epistemically unsuspect” or what he calls 
“epistemically-in-the-clear”. An attribution 
of a property becomes epistemically unsus-
pect or epistemically-in-the-clear for the 
subject if and only if no other attribution or 
property disconfirms such attribution. In 
other words, an attribution is epistemically-
in-the-clear provided it is not disconfirmed 
by any set of properties that have some pre-
sumptions in their favour. Therefore, Chis-
holm’s “epistemic-in-the-clear” and Des-
cartes’ “clarity and distinctness” are similar 
by the fact that they both serve as epistemic 
foundation. 
 
Chisholm objected to the position that ba-
sic proposition is infallibility. He argues that 
man by nature is fallible (to err is human) 
and no human can be exonerated from er-
rors or making mistakes He only acknowl-
edges the fact that there is a positive rela-
tion between epistemically justified belief 
and truth, and favours justified true belief as 
knowledge. If one wants to believe what is 
true and not what is false, then it will be 
most reasonable for him to believe what is 
epistemically justified than what is not epis-
temically justified. Only on this basis Chis-
holm consent to “self-presenting” as a 
foundation for knowledge. 
 
Chisholm is one of the strongest advocates 
of fallibilism and their arguments are basi-
cally on two prongs: the possibility of direct 
knowledge and the Gettier problem. Chis-
holm argues against the possibility of direct 
knowledge and particularly non-inferential 
knowledge. Observation can only be pure 
and direct if it requires no interpretation. 
Any observation that involves interpretation 
ipso facto cannot be error free. In fact, all ob-
servations are unavoidably theory-bound. 
No where is human entirely immune to the 
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for knowledge. The moment we agree to 
give this bare proposition enough content to 
make it adequate for knowledge claim e.g. “I 
know there is a red patch before me” or “I 
can see a red patch in front of me” then, we 
immediately lose the claim to infallibility. It 
is upon this consideration that swayed Chis-
holm to favour the Moorean’s account of 
basic propositions. For the Mooreans, basic 
propositions are incorrigible because there is 
no other standard upon which they can be 
corrected. But while the Mooreans went fur-
ther to assert that these propositions are 
readily observable facts, Chisholm reverted 
to being a Cartesian. His “self-presenting” 
property, based on my reading, is a private 
psychological state that presents itself to the 
subject. However, there are so many other 
problems associated with warrants to cer-
tainty (see Lewis, 1929; Firth, 1967:7-8; 
Fogelin 1994:88-9; Audi, 1998: 218-9; Bon-
jour, 1985:26; Lehrer, 1990:45; Jeshion, 
2000:334-5). 
 
The second sense in which Chisholm cannot 
be considered a strict foundationalist is that 
he borrowed an element from coherentism. 
For the classical foundationalist, basic 
propositions can act as the basic foundation 
of knowledge claim because they justified 
themselves. In other words, these proposi-
tions do not need the justification of other 
propositions. They are the last at the infalli-
ble level of justification. But, going by our 
previous argument, if the claim to infallibil-
lism cannot be sustained, what is the future 
of those propositions? In the concurrence 
principle (the 8th principle), Chisholm argued 
for concurrent set of beliefs which lend sup-
port to each of its member. The conjunction 
of all the members in the set confirms it and 
is also logically independent of it. How does 
this hang together with the Cartesian impli-
cations that the “self-presenting” property 
table knowledge. The same thing goes for 
the classical British empiricists whose sole 
aim was to remove all obstacles on the way 
towards enhancing clear perception and un-
derstanding. Chisholm’s version of founda-
tionalism could rightly be seen as a kind of 
a retreat of classical foundationalism. It is 
what one can call a weak foundationalism 
because it waters down those features that 
make strong classical foundationalism. 
However, he cannot be accused of aban-
doning what makes foundationalism really 
foundational as his attempt could be com-
pared to Susan Haack’s syncretism: an at-
tempt to synthesize the best elements in 
foundationalism and coherentism. 
 
At the heart of Chisholm’s version of foun-
dationalism is the concept of the “self-
presenting”. This concept, as we have ear-
lier noted, is the closest element in classical 
foundationalism and that which makes 
Chisholm a foundationalist. The “self-
presenting” is Cartesian in the sense that 
the property presents itself intuitively the 
same way Descartes’ “clear and distinct” 
ideas constitute basic propositions that 
structures knowledge claim. One becomes 
sure of it by deliberation and reflection 
which means, one must consider the fact 
whether one has it or not. This condition is 
the same as the second Cartesian element. 
 
But Chisholm stopped-short of being a 
strict foundationalist in two important 
senses. In the first sense, he sided with the 
Moorean foundationalist in arguing that 
basic beliefs are fallible. “It seems to me as 
if I am seeing…” or “I seem to be see-
ing…” is the farthest the Cartesian can go 
in claiming infallibility. But, with the propo-
sition “I seem to be seeing a red patch be-
fore me” does not assert the existence of a 
red patch and as such cannot be sufficient 
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the last point from which you cannot go fur-
ther. It serves as the basis for other proposi-
tions that are indirectly evident. But the 
problem now is: does the basic proposition, 
the “self-presenting” state of affair really 
provide the basis for the indirectly evident 
propositions? 
 
On Chisholm’s account, if S believes without 
doubt that he perceives something to be “F” 
and “F” is a member of a set which is be-
yond reasonable doubt for “S” then it is evi-
dent for “S” that he perceives something to 
be “F”. One can counterpoised that on the 
basis of this one could still not claim knowl-
edge. To prove this, all one needs to do is to 
formulate another propositions (b): “S is 
perceiving something which appears or looks 
F”. This proposition would satisfy three con-
ditions: (a) it is beyond reasonable doubt for 
S, (b) it is more reasonable for S to accept 
proposition (B) than that “S is perceiving 
something to be F”, and (c) proposition (b) 
is not certain for S (that is, S considers the 
probability of illusion; or for (b), one is less 
likely to be mistaken). Thus, one can con-
clude, we can’t be certain that we know that 
we are perceiving something to be F. If this 
is so, the objection continues, then, we are 
not clear whether the basic proposition can 
provide the basis for justifying the indirectly 
evident propositions. 
 
Let us consider an example again which 
would seem to follow from Chisholm’s prin-
ciple. If we accept (a) S believes without 
doubt that he perceives something to be 
white, then he argued, it would seem to be 
the case that (a) provides the basis for justi-
fying the indirectly evidence proposition (b): 
S does perceives something which is white. 
In other words, if (a) is true, (b) is evident 
for S. but in this case, if (a) is not certain, 
that is, if it is beyond reasonable doubt for S 
harbours? Since infallibillism has been taken 
way, the “self-presenting” is still founda-
tional in the sense that the property is a pri-
vate psychological state. Chisholm allowed 
the content of such a bare sensory state to 
be supplied by evidential presuppositions to 
play a strictly supportive role to it. The “self
-presenting” property is thus the incorrigi-
ble limit from which one cannot go further. 
The “evidential presuppositions” caveat 
confirms Chisholm’s debt to coherentism: 
the knowledge based on the foundation 
provided by the “self-presenting” property 
is not immune to the epistemological results 
of future inquiry. This element is also pre-
sent in Chisholsm’s modification of the tri-
partite account of knowledge. For him, S 
knows that P if and only (1) S accepts P; (ii) 
S has adequate evidence for P; and (iii) P is 
true. His analysis of knowledge, as we noted 
earlier, is based on epistemic preferability or 
reasonability. 
 
But there is one last issue which Chisholm’s 
version of foundationalism must confront. 
Let us put it in the interrogative form: Does 
Chisholm’s version of foundationalism es-
caped the regress problem? Chisholm con-
fronted this problem this way. If “a is F” is 
justified by is “G”, and this is in turn justi-
fied by “C & H”, what justifies me in think-
ing that I know that “a is F”? This question 
is important if one is to avoid an infinite 
regress or a vicious circularity. Chisholm 
considered this question and come to the 
conclusion that what justifies me in thinking 
that I know that “a is F” is simply the fact 
that “a is F”. This is so for him, because “a 
is F” is directly evident. But, one can simply 
ask, what does “directly evident” mean for 
Chisholm? The “directly evident” in this 
sense is not different from the “self-
presenting” state of affair. So, Chisholm 
contended, “a is F” is self-presenting; it is 
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cal conditions of knowledge. The mark of 
difference, as mentioned above, is in his reli-
ance on logical explanation of the conditions 
and in projecting self-presenting as fallible. 
The classical foundationalist’s conditions are: 
S knows that P is true if and only if (i) P is 
true (ii) S believes that P and (iii) S is justified 
in believing that P. Of course, it is because a 
person believes in a thing that makes him 
accepts that thing. If one does not have ade-
quate evidence for something, it will be diffi-
cult for one to accept that thing and once 
this situation arises, one is tempted not to 
believe that such a thing is true. This is the 
basis of its rejection. If Chisholm’s version is 
not included in the classical version, then it 
could simply be classified as one. This asser-
tion is true just in the sense of the statement 
of the conditions but, in terms of explana-
tion, Chisholm is more difficult to under-
stand than the classical foundationalist con-
sidering his logical inference. 
 
If Chisholm had actually believed in compre-
hensiveness which of course, his eight prin-
ciples entails, then his explanation of the 
condition for knowledge should not have 
been so restrictive as demonstrated. Because 
he had put all his explanation in logical for-
mulations, he had consciously eliminated 
some other vital condition for knowledge. 
This has not really helped him in his lofty 
reasonability and reliability project. Reason-
ability connotes common-sense but the cum-
bersomeness of his explanation is far away 
from what common-sense can easily grasp. 
 
CONCLUSION 
However both Chisholm and Descartes (our 
example of the classical foundationalist) are 
co-travelers in the same boat. Chisholm, just 
like Descartes had come into the philosophi-
cal scene to solve some problems. The duo 
and many others before and after them have 
to believe the proposition (b) above, then 
(a) does not entail (b). Thus, if (b) is indi-
rectly evident, it does not follow that it 
must be true. So, since the relationship be-
tween the self-presenting and the indirectly 
evident is not one of entailment and since 
relationship can’t hold it is devoid of rea-
son, then Chisholm’s claim fails. 
 
 
Critique of Chisholm’s position 
From the discussion so far, it could be de-
duced that Chisholm relied heavily on logic 
to explain the basic criterion for founda-
tionalism. Logic is the philosophical tool 
used in clearing ambiguities and uncertain-
ties in discourses, yet it is not sufficient to 
establish the foundation for knowledge. 
Chisholm’s logic applies to explicit proposi-
tions which are “self-presenting” and ana-
lytical, but, does our everyday conversation 
not go beyond these kinds of propositions? 
How do we know or determine the truth of 
our everyday inter-personal discussions? Do 
we not have other criteria which are more 
viable and simpler than the criterion Chis-
holm offers? All the eight logical principles 
discussed by Chisholm have their assur-
ances in the truth of the logical bi-
conditional principle; yet, the concurrent 
principle does not cohere with the rest of 
the principles proposed. 
 
It could further be argued that Chisholm’s 
conditions for knowledge: that S knows that 
P is true if and only if (i) S accepts P, (ii) S 
has adequate evidence for P and (iii) P is 
true; are repetitive and just saying the same 
thing. In fact, they all amount to tautology 
in the sense that they all assert that P is true. 
Conditions i & ii are just part of the consid-
eration for reaching the conclusion that P is 
true. Chisholm’s conditions are not quite 
different in any special way from the classi-
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come to resuscitate the traditional analysis 
of knowledge in different modes of founda-
tionalism. Chisholm has neither completely 
solved the problem of epistemic foundation 
rather his solution has created further prob-
lems for philosophers and scholars to solve 
just as we are doing in this paper. Neither 
Descartes nor other classical foundational-
ists have been able to resolve the problem. 
After all, phenomenalism, epiphenomenalism, ide-
alism, etc., are variants of foundationalism. 
 
However, Chisholm’s version of founda-
tionalism is of a more veritable develop-
ment over the Cartesian’s version in the 
sense that the foundation of knowledge 
conceived as self-presenting is adjustable in 
the face of other evidence preferable to the 
former. Notwithstanding, as long as re-
search remains germane to human develop-
ment foundationalism will always be rele-
vant to knowledge development. In every 
attempt by every philosopher to say some-
thing new makes him a researcher and rele-
vant to human knowledge development. 
Since this attitude remains an intellectual 
activity then such an activity will remain a 
continuum, and this is what keeps any aca-
demic endeavours, including philosophy, 
going. This is the reason why there are dif-
ferent theories and theorists. 
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